**Presentation Structure (20 minutes, 2 presenters alternating at 5 min intervals) DRAFT 1**

**Topic: Strategic Communication and Public Trust: Managing Ethical Boundaries in the Irish Defence Forces in the Era of Social Media and Disinformation**

**Segment 1 (0–5 mins) — Finola**

Framing the Issue & Core Concepts

Welcome and outline presentation structure.

Why strategic communication matters in the Defence Forces: sustaining legitimacy in democracy.

Define key concepts: strategic communication, public trust, ethical boundaries.

Set up the central dilemma: How to be transparent and trusted while protecting operational security?

Introduce the challenge of social media: speed, reach, and loss of narrative control.

**Segment 2 (5–10 mins) — Adam**

**Segment 2 (5–10 mins) – Ethical Tensions & the Digital Environment**

**Core Themes to Cover**

* **Transparency vs Secrecy**
  + **Hypothetical IDF example**: A domestic security operation where misinformation spreads online about troop movements.
    - If leaders confirm details → they risk compromising security.
    - If they remain silent → rumours fuel distrust (“what are they hiding?”).
  + Illustrates the **tightrope leaders walk**.
* **Persuasion vs Propaganda**
  + Strategic communication should inform and reassure, but if overused or spun it risks **“propaganda creep.”**
  + Once credibility is questioned, every future message is treated with suspicion — trust is lost faster than it can be rebuilt.
* **The Social Media Environment**
  + Rumour speed, echo chambers, algorithmic amplification.
  + **Bachmann (2023):** Ukraine shows how disinformation undermines legitimacy.
  + **Lemmon (2024):** disinformation as deliberate hybrid warfare tactic.
* **Moral and Ethical Dilemmas**
  + **VU Research Portal:** obedience vs moral judgement.
  + **Mad Scientist Laboratory (2025):** AI and deepfakes complicate ethical calls.
  + **Heifetz (1994):** adaptive leadership needed in complexity.

**Likely Conclusion for Segment 2**

* Ethical communication in the IDF requires walking a fine line:
  + Too much secrecy → suspicion.
  + Too much openness → operational compromise.
* **Propaganda creep is the greatest risk**: once credibility erodes, public trust collapses.
* Leaders must **exercise judgement**, balancing transparency with necessity while safeguarding the institution’s reputation.

Great — let’s consolidate everything into a **clear, prioritised source list for Section 2 (Ethical Tensions & the Digital Environment)** of your presentation. I’ll give you:

1. **Prolific authors** (those who appear repeatedly in the field).
2. **Top 5 must-use sources** (to directly answer your CLEM exam question).
3. **Remaining sources, ordered by importance/relevance** for sharpening your analysis.

**1. Prolific Authors for Section 2**

* **Stefan Gunneriusson (2017–2024)** → multiple works on hybrid warfare, disinformation, narrative strategies. A consistent voice across nearly a decade.
* **Bachmann (2023)** → though a single key paper, widely cited and central to current debates.
* **Ahmed (2022, 2023)** → active in exploring AI, disinformation, and ethical dilemmas in military/strategic contexts.

**2. Five Most Important Sources (Core Backbone)**

These are the sources you should definitely read, cite, and build arguments from:

1. **Bachmann, S. (2023) *Hybrid Warfare and Disinformation: A Ukraine War Perspective***
   * Anchor source. Shows how disinformation operates as a weapon in hybrid warfare, undermining legitimacy and public trust.
2. **NATO StratCom COE (2016) *Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare***
   * Seminal institutional report. Explains how adversaries exploit social media; directly ties into IDF vulnerabilities.
3. **Lemmon, J. (2024) *Disinformation as Hybrid Warfare***
   * Recent, strategic framing of disinformation as an operational tool. Reinforces Bachmann and NATO perspectives.
4. **Ahmed (2022/2023)**
   * Focuses on AI-driven disinformation and ethical dilemmas — essential for linking ethical tensions to emerging technology.
5. **Irish Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine (2015)**
   * Critical for anchoring ethical communication and leadership dilemmas in the Irish Defence Forces’ own doctrinal context.

**3. Remaining Sources (Ranked by Relevance)**

**High Priority (strong support and case material)**

* **Gunneriusson (2017, 2019, 2021, 2024)** → shows evolution of thinking on disinformation & narrative control in hybrid warfare.
* **Sierra-Zamora (2022)** → legal and ethical framing of disinformation in democratic contexts.
* **Symenolidis (2025)** → very recent, expands on strategic implications of disinformation in security.
* **Davies (2024)** → up-to-date case material, complements Bachmann with operational relevance.

**Medium Priority (adds breadth and nuance)**

* **VU Research Portal (Moral dilemmas in a military context)** → good for illustrating obedience vs moral judgement.
* **Mad Scientist Laboratory (2025, Ethical Dilemmas of Future Warfare)** → thought-leadership style source, good for pointing to emerging risks (AI, deepfakes).
* **Taylor, P. (2003) *Munitions of the Mind*** → classic on propaganda. Historical foundation for your “propaganda creep” point.
* **Rid, T. (2020) *Active Measures*** → authoritative history of disinformation, good for contextual depth.

**Lower Priority (background or peripheral perspectives)**

* **Peterson (2024)** → adds context on hybrid threats, but less directly tied to IDF leadership.
* **Marrin (2018)** → intelligence studies angle, useful but not central.
* **Flores-Saviaga (2022), Heineman (2022), Matting(s)dal (2023), Tsypka (2024)** → more technical/sociological, could be used to add nuance about digital ecosystems but not necessary for the core argument.

**Summary**

* **Prolific voices:** Gunneriusson, Bachmann, Ahmed.
* **Top 5 core sources:** Bachmann (2023), NATO StratCom COE (2016), Lemmon (2024), Ahmed (2022/23), DF Leadership Doctrine (2015).
* **Next tier:** Gunneriusson series, Sierra-Zamora (2022), Symenolidis (2025), Davies (2024).
* **Optional depth:** VU Portal, Mad Scientist Lab, Taylor (2003), Rid (2020), others.

Would you like me to **reformat this into a clean, Harvard-style reference list (with full citations)** so you can drop it straight into your slides/handouts?

**Segment 3 (10–15 mins) — Finola**

Leadership Responsibilities & Ethical Strategies

Leadership as the anchor of credibility: Defence leaders must embody trustworthiness.

Strategies for ethical communication:

Clear guidelines for official and personal use of social media.

Rapid, fact-based responses to false narratives.

Transparency in crises to maintain confidence.

The importance of consistency, authenticity, and ethical standards in all communication.

**Segment 4 (15–20 mins) — Adam**

**Segment 4 (15–20 mins) – Building Resilience & Leadership Strategies**

**Core Themes to Cover**

* **Institutional Resilience**
  + **Dimov (2024):** digital literacy → first defence against disinformation.
  + **U.S. Army War College (2024):** inoculation approach → train before crisis, not just react.
  + Directly counters risks from Segment 2’s environment: equips personnel to spot and resist rumours, echo chambers, and manipulation.
* **Frameworks & Tools**
  + **NATO StratCom COE Toolkit:** practical training modules and scenario-based exercises.
  + **Example for Ireland**: Adapt the EU East StratCom Task Force’s collaboration model — fact-checking networks and media monitoring — scaled to Ireland’s small-state resources.
* **Leadership Role in Resilience**
  + **IMD (2025):** communication under pressure requires clarity and consistency.
  + Leaders at all levels must **model trustworthiness** — otherwise institutional training is undermined.
  + **Wilson (1989), Nagl (2002), Fitzgerald (2013):** organisational learning is essential to avoid inertia and “doctrinal amnesia.”
* **Whole-of-Society Partnerships**
  + DF alone cannot combat disinformation.
  + **NATO/EU example**: Latvia’s cooperation between military, government, and civil media outlets — rapid rebuttals of Russian disinformation campaigns.
  + Adaptable to Ireland: government–Defence–media partnership that reinforces credibility without overextension.

**Likely Conclusion for Segment 4**

* Public trust is **strategic capital**: fragile, easily lost.
* Resilience measures must directly **counter the digital threats identified in Segment 2** — by strengthening literacy, training, and partnerships.
* Practical cooperation models (NATO/EU) show that small states can punch above their weight through credible, ethical communication.
* IDF must embed these practices into its leadership culture to safeguard legitimacy in a contested information space.

**Step 1 – What the Wire Diagram Shows (Section 4 cluster)**

Central nodes are:

* **Svetoka (2016)** → clearly the anchor, most connected. NATO StratCom COE paper on Russian information warfare & resilience.
* **Efird (2003), Fleming (2011), Mumford (2013)** → large, connected nodes, suggesting important secondary anchors.
* **Campbell (2007), Axtmann (2007), Dewey (2014), Mann (2010)** → mid-level connections.
* **Peripheral but linked:** Darczewska (2014), Kragh (2017), Morrison (2012), Mahnken (2021).

**Step 2 – Key Prolific Authors (Section 4 cluster)**

* **Svetoka (2016)** → NATO StratCom COE analyst; widely cited in hybrid warfare/disinformation resilience.
* **Efird (2003) + Fleming (2011)** → not prolific like Gunneriusson in Section 2, but centrally placed in this network (influence + citations).
* **Mumford (2013)** → appears in wider literature on strategy and resilience; credible anchor for leadership dimension.

**Step 3 – Top 5 Most Important Sources for Section 4**

These provide the backbone for resilience and leadership strategies:

1. **Svetoka, S. (2016) *Fighting Disinformation: A Call for Strategy* (NATO StratCom COE).**
   * Anchor source. Directly about resilience, countering disinfo, and building strategic capacity.
2. **Darczewska, J. (2014) *The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare*.**
   * Important empirical case; how resilience can counter sustained disinfo campaigns.
3. **Mumford, A. (2013) *Proxy Warfare*.**
   * Indirect but key for understanding how hybrid and proxy threats demand resilient communication.
4. **Kragh, M. (2017) *Russia’s Strategy for Influence through Disinformation*.**
   * Strong case study linking disinfo → resilience gaps.
5. **Efird, B. (2003) *Information Strategy and National Resilience*.**
   * Older but foundational in resilience debates; ties directly to strategic comms.

**Step 4 – Supporting Sources (Ranked by Relevance)**

**High Priority (good support for IDF resilience framing)**

* **Fleming (2011)** → governance and resilience in the info space.
* **Campbell (2007)** → national resilience in defence policy context.
* **Dewey (2014)** → societal resilience, useful for linking DF partnerships with wider public.
* **Mann (2010)** → leadership & adaptation, strengthens the organisational learning angle.

**Medium Priority (add breadth, not core)**

* **Heinegg (2013)** → international law, information ops.
* **Morrison (2012)** → resilience in organisations.
* **Caliskan (2019), Mahnken (2021)** → strategic studies focus, broadens security context.

**Peripheral (background reading only)**

* **Spinuzzi (2012), Lipsky (1982), Howe (1916)** → older/less directly relevant, background on bureaucracy, street-level leadership, or classic theory.

**Step 5 – Assessment vs. CLEM Presentation Needs**

* **Content:** The Top 5 (Svetoka, Darczewska, Mumford, Kragh, Efird) provide a *credible, diverse, and authoritative set* of sources.
* **Analysis:** Supporting works (Fleming, Campbell, Dewey, Mann) let you expand into leadership, learning, and whole-of-society resilience.
* **Style:** NATO/EU-based works (Svetoka, Darczewska) are authoritative and recognisable to assessors.
* **Leadership linkage:** Mumford, Dewey, Mann connect resilience directly to leadership responsibilities.

✅ **Conclusion:**  
For **Section 4**, your **anchor source is Svetoka (2016)**. Build out with Darczewska (2014), Mumford (2013), Kragh (2017), and Efird (2003). Then weave in Fleming, Campbell, Dewey, and Mann to cover leadership and organisational adaptation.

**Timing Summary**

Finola: Segments 1 and 3 (0–5 and 10–15)

Adam: Segments 2 and 4 (5–10 and 15–20)

Total = 20 minutes, no Q&A.

**POWER POINT SLIDE SUGGESTIONS:**

**SLIDE 1 – Title Slide**

\*\*Title:\*\* Strategic Communication and Public Trust

\*\*Subtitle:\*\* Managing Ethical Boundaries in the Irish Defence Forces in the Era of Social Media & Disinformation

Visual: Blended image of Irish Defence Forces crest + digital/social media icons + trust/handshake symbol.

**SLIDE 2 – Introduction (Finola)**

\*\*Header:\*\* Why This Matters

Bullet points:

- Public trust = cornerstone of Defence legitimacy

- Strategic communication = tool for credibility & influence

- New challenge: Social media & disinformation

- Visual: Scales balancing \*trust\* vs \*secrecy\*.

**SLIDE 3 – Core Concepts (Finola)**

\*\*Strategic Communication:\*\* planned, purposeful messaging aligning with mission.

\*\*Public Trust:\*\* confidence in Defence Forces as professional, apolitical, accountable.

\*\*Ethical Boundaries:\*\* honesty, transparency, integrity.

- Visual: Three interlocking circles with the terms.

**SLIDE 4 – Central Dilemma (Finola)**

\*\*Question:\*\* \*How can Defence leaders remain transparent & trusted without compromising security?\*

- Visual: Lock symbol overlaid with open book (security vs transparency).

**SLIDE 5 – Ethical Tensions (Adam)**

\*\*Transparency vs Secrecy\*\*

\*\*Persuasion vs Propaganda\*\*

\*\*Information vs Influence\*\*

Key Idea: Grey zones demand careful leadership judgement.

Visual: Path splitting into two, signposted \*Trust\* vs \*Manipulation\*.

**SLIDE 6 – Social Media Environment (Adam)**

\*\*Risks:\*\*

- Speed of rumours

- Echo chambers

- Loss of narrative control

- Visual: Smartphone screen with chaotic feed of news, memes, hashtags.

**SLIDE 7 – Disinformation Threats (Adam)**

\*\*Definition:\*\* deliberate falsehoods to undermine trust.

\*\*Impact:\*\* weakens legitimacy, divides public, erodes morale.

Example: Hypothetical campaign sowing doubt about IDF readiness.

Visual: Puppet strings over news headlines.

**SLIDE 8 – Leadership Responsibilities (Finola**)

\*\*Leaders must:\*\*

- Embody trustworthiness

- Balance openness & security

- Model ethical communication

- Visual: Silhouette of officer addressing troops + public.

**SLIDE 9 – Ethical Communication Strategies (Finola)**

\*\*Approaches:\*\*

- Clear social media guidelines

- Fact-based, rapid rebuttals

- Crisis transparency & consistency

- Visual: Shield with checkmarks = protection through truth.

**SLIDE 10 – Collaboration & Resilience (Adam)**

\*\*Key Elements:\*\*

- Government–media–tech partnerships

- Digital literacy training in Defence Forces

- Long-term resilience through credibility

- Visual: Network diagram of Defence, media, government, public.

**SLIDE 11 – Takeaways (Adam)**

- Public trust is strategic capital – once lost, hard to regain.

- Balance of \*\*trust, ethics, effectiveness\*\* is essential.

- Leaders must adapt to disinformation age while upholding democratic values.

- Visual: Open hand holding both shield (security) and torch (truth).

**SLIDE 12 – Closing Slide**

\*\*Quote:\*\* \*“Trust is earned in drops and lost in buckets.”\*

\*\*Closing Message:\*\* The Irish Defence Forces must communicate with integrity to safeguard democracy in an age of disinformation.

Visual: Irish flag subtly blended with digital code background.

# Comprehensive Annotated Reading List and Analysis Framework

This document provides a comprehensive reading list organised by presentation segment, with annotations explaining each source’s contribution to the topic. It also includes a structured analysis framework aligned with the CLEM marking rubric, JCSC learning outcomes, and Maynooth University academic standards.

## Annotated Reading List (by Segment)

### Segment 1 – Framing the Issue & Core Concepts

* Defence Forces (2015) Leadership Doctrine. Curragh Camp: DFTC. – Core doctrinal reference setting leadership philosophy and mission command principles.
* Paul, C. (2011) Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. – Foundational RAND text introducing strategic communication concepts and debates.
* EEAS (2022, 2023) StratCom Task Force Annual Reports. Brussels: EEAS. – Current operational insights into disinformation and EU communication responses.
* Bennett, W.L. & Livingston, S. (2018) ‘The disinformation order’, European Journal of Communication, 33(2). – Peer-reviewed study examining structural challenges to democratic communication.
* Hedling, E. (2021) ‘Transforming practices of diplomacy: the EEAS and the East StratCom Task Force’, International Affairs, 97(3). – Explores EU StratCom practice transformation in response to hybrid threats.
* Rid, T. (2020) Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. – Historical analysis of covert influence operations, highlighting disinformation as strategic practice.
* Government of Ireland (2015) White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Department of Defence. – Outlines Ireland’s defence policy framework, balancing secrecy and transparency.
* Taylor, P.M. (2003) Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda. Manchester University Press. – Classic history of propaganda, contextualising persuasion versus propaganda debates.
* NATO StratCom COE (2016) Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare. Riga: NATO StratCom COE. – Seminal analysis of how adversaries weaponise social media in conflict settings.
* Nimmo, B. & François, C. (2019) Networked Disinformation: Case Studies. Graphika. – Empirical case studies showing disinformation tactics and network dynamics.
* François, C. (2019) Actors, Behaviors, Content: A Disinformation ABC. – Framework for categorising disinformation campaigns, useful for structured analysis.
* Wither, J.K. (2023) ‘Hybrid warfare revisited’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 22(1). – Critiques and clarifies the concept of hybrid warfare, preventing conceptual overreach.
* Chiru, I. & Buluc, R. (2024) ‘An Ethical Understanding of Military Strategic Communication’, in Routledge Handbook of Disinformation and National Security. – Academic discussion on ethical boundaries in military communication, including persuasion and propaganda.

### Segment 3 – Leadership Responsibilities & Ethical Strategies

* Defence Forces (2015) Leadership Doctrine. – Defines leadership responsibilities and ethical expectations for Defence Forces leaders.
* Krulak, C.C. (1999) ‘The Strategic Corporal’, Marine Corps Gazette, 83(1). – Argues that junior leaders’ actions have strategic consequences, linking tactical ethics to strategic trust.
* Heifetz, R. (1994) Leadership Without Easy Answers. Harvard University Press. – Introduces adaptive leadership framework, supporting ethical decision-making in complexity.
* Commission on the Defence Forces (2022) Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces. Dublin: Government of Ireland. – Provides recommendations for reform and communication strategies to strengthen trust.
* Farragher, D. (2023) ‘Is Just Culture compatible with Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine?’, Journal of Military History and Defence Studies. – Analyses compatibility between Just Culture and Defence Forces leadership principles.
* Lawlor, C. (2022) A Bourdieusian Analysis of PME in the Irish Defence Forces (EdD thesis, University of York). – Explores officer education and cultural identity through Bourdieu’s theory of habitus.

### Segment 4 – Building Resilience & Concluding Takeaways

### Segment 2 – Ethical Tensions & the Digital Environment

### Developing those around you, particularly your immediate subordinates and developing a cohesive team

* Government of Ireland (2015) White Paper on Defence. – Foundational defence policy reference for resilience debates.
* UN DPO (2022/2024) Policy on Information Integrity in Peacekeeping. – Outlines UN approaches to safeguarding information in multinational operations.
* Husain, A. & Allen, J.R. (2017) ‘On Hyperwar’, USNI Proceedings, 143(7). – Introduces the concept of accelerating, AI-enabled conflict environments.
* NATO StratCom COE (2016) Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare. – Highlights ongoing social media threats relevant to Defence Forces resilience.
* EEAS (2022, 2023) StratCom Annual Reports. – Provides up-to-date EU perspectives on resilience against disinformation.
* Pennycook, G. & Rand, D.G. (2021) ‘The psychology of fake news’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 25(5). – Cognitive psychology insights into why misinformation spreads and how resilience can be built.
* Zannettou, S. et al. (2018) ‘The web of false information’, arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.03461. – Taxonomy of online misinformation ecosystems and behaviours.
* Leite, J.A. et al. (2024) ‘A cross-domain study of persuasion in online disinformation’, arXiv preprint. – Recent study of persuasion tactics across digital contexts, informing counter-disinformation strategies.

## Presentation Analysis Framework

This framework ensures presentations are assessed and prepared in line with JCSC CLEM module requirements, academic standards, and the marking rubric.

* Content (40%): Use of sources, breadth/depth of research, theoretical framework, and accuracy.
* Analysis (40%): Evaluation, logical reasoning, synthesis, and engagement with counterarguments.
* Style (10%): Expression, tone, structure, clarity, and oral presentation skills.
* Individual Contribution (10%): Knowledge, reasoning, ability to answer questions, and critical engagement.
* Alignment with JCSC Outcomes: Demonstrate advanced understanding of leadership, ethics, mission command, strategy, and NATO/EU/UN contexts.
* Referencing Standards: Follow Maynooth Harvard Style: in-text citations (Author, Year), page numbers for quotes, alphabetical reference list, no URLs in-text.